School Voucher Debate

 

 

PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS:

CONSIDERING A MILWAULKEE-STYLE

VOUCHER PLAN FOR CALIFORNIA

 

A policy research and analysis paper

 

 

By

Edward Ober

4/28/2008

"Education is here placed among the articles of public care, not that it would be proposed to take its ordinary branches out of the hands of private enterprise, which manages so much better all the concerns to which it is equal; but a public institution can alone supply those sciences which, though rarely called for, are yet necessary to complete the circle, all the parts of which contribute to the improvement of the country, and some of them to its preservation."

-- Thomas Jefferson: 6th Annual Message, 1806. ME 3:423

 

I.                   Introduction

 
We are asked to consider a Milwaukee-style[1] school voucher plan for the state of California.  The goal of this report is to analyze the available relevant literature on the subject and to formulate a policy position. I will examine the goals of the voucher proposal, the evidence for and against, the feasibility of the policy and finally an assessment of the policy from both ‘quality’ and ‘ideology’ viewpoints.

 The pressure for vouchers comes from three primary sources.  The first, and most visibly obvious, is a negative reaction from the public caused by poorly performing schools.  This pressure fluctuates with the public’s perceptions of school and student performance.  What motivates this segment of people is a) the desire for ‘high’ quality education for their children, b) perception that public schools are substantially below ‘high’ quality, and c) perception that the public school system is not responsive to calls for reform (Weil, 2002).  The term ‘high’ here is subjective and there are many disagreeing viewpoints on what constitutes a ‘good’ education (Goldberg, 1996).  This source of pressure could be relieved by increasing public perception of higher public school performance or altering the commonly accepted definition of ‘high’ quality (i.e. lowering the bar).  I call this the ‘quality’ argument.  This argument contends that schools who are forced to compete in the free market will by necessity improve the quality of education (Blum, 1958; Weil, 2002).  Some argue that this will not necessarily harm the public school system.  Some quality proponents argue that vouchers will stimulate more competition between public schools, and thereby “encourage diversity and choice within the public system” (La Noue, 1972, p.51), essentially describing the model of charter schools.  Charters are privately operated but publicly funded.  They are more strictly regulated than private schools.  Charters are distinct from private vouchers and they should not be confused, but they are similar in that they both propose to take some of the public money allocated for education (Vergari, 2007).

 The second source of pressure for vouchers comes from groups and individuals promoting the idea of helping poor and minority students (Weil, 2002; La Noue, 1972).  People using this argument may tend to support policies or programs which they believe will elevate poor, minority or otherwise disadvantaged students to be more on par with the majority (Cooper, 2005; Leal, 2004).  I call this the ‘equity’ argument.  It is closely related to the quality argument, but whereas the quality argument encompasses better quality for all students, the equity argument is only concerned with seeing improvements for targeted group(s).

The third source of pressure comes from groups and individuals promoting ideological and philosophical reasons for moving to a voucher program.  This argument is not based on issues of school quality or equity, although it will certainly point out that the low quality and inequity of public schools is just further confirmation that government has no business in education in the first place (Weil, 2002; La Noue, 1972).  It is important to understand that people coming from this perspective would continue to support privatizing education regardless of the quality or equity of the schools.  This argument is founded in American political thought favoring the free market, minimal government and laissez faire philosophy, first written about by Adam Smith and echoed by Milton Friedman, among others (La Noue, 1972).  I call this the ‘ideology’ argument.

 It is important to recognize that the quality and equity arguments both are influenced by analyses of the actual performance of voucher programs (Krueger, 2004).  Thus, if voucher programs were proven to reduce quality or equity many, if not most, of these proponents would change their view on vouchers.  The ideology position, however, would not be influenced by any evidence showing vouchers reduce quality or equity. 

 While our nation was indeed built with a strong free-market philosophy from its inception, it has been tempered by the argument that the market can fail in some cases, and that in those cases government intervention is appropriate and necessary (Stone, 2007).  The public school system was instituted based on a popular perception that only government-run education could ensure that all children receive an education regardless of ability to pay (NEA, 2008; Foreman, 2004; Weil, 2002).  This value is based on the Jeffersonian (1800) idea that an educated citizenry is essential for the proper functioning of democracy, and therefore that it is for the public welfare that public schools are operated (La Noue, 1972; NEAW, 2008).  One supposition within this argument is that without a public school system some children might not get any education at all.  I refer to this as the ‘public’ argument.

 II.        Goals

 Each of the three arguments for vouchers has different goals and therefore different methods of measuring success.  The goal for the quality argument is to see an improvement in overall student achievement and school performance.  Standardized testing is the predominant method of gauging performance of students, and although also widely criticized (Goldberg, 1996), quality and performance continue to be measured by this tool (Weil, 2002).   The goal for the equity argument is to see an equalization of performance between poor and minority students and everyone else.  The goal for the ideology argument is to see privatization occur to the greatest extent possible in all areas of government, including education.  I will explore them each briefly.  The goal for the public argument remains the same: free basic education for all children.  For this goal the measurement is the extent to which all students received this ‘basic’ education, and it is measured in population served and graduation rates (Weil, 2002; Goldberg, 1996). 

Quality Goals: Improved Student Performance.  Proponents of the quality argument believe the performance of the public school system is inadequate based on standardized measurement techniques, and that vouchers will improve student achievement on standardized tests as well as allow innovation of new performance measurement tools that public schools stifle (Uhler, 2000; Weil, 2002).  Also satisfaction of parents and students, although subjective, is considered by many to be a viable measurement of quality (Dillon, 2007; Witte, 1999).  In order to determine whether this goal has been reached, proponents are interested in measuring student performance among students who use the voucher to see if their achievement increases (Kreuger, 2004).

One problem with the quality argument lies in the fact that it does not place an importance on improvement of the students remaining in the public school system.  The research to date has been primarily concerned with measuring the improvement of performance of those students who use the voucher, and those who remain in the public school are essentially a control group with little significance except as a basis for comparison (NEA, 2008; Weil, 2002; Angrist et. al., 2006).  A regulated voucher system like the Milwaukee plan limits participation to a certain number of students and there are inevitably large numbers of students remaining in the public schools who are impacted by the loss of public school funding through diversion to vouchers (Harvard Law Review, 2007).  The long-term impact on this ‘control group’ has been largely understated.

Equity Goals: Improved Comparative Performance of Target Group(s).  Proponents of the equity argument believe that the public school system, whether intentionally or not, systematically educates poor and minority children to a lesser degree than others, and that vouchers will allow these disadvantaged students to choose a school where they will receive a better education.  For this argument, measurement of student performance is done by comparing the voucher student’s performance individually and compared to other racial and socioeconomic groups of students in their school, both pre and post voucher use (Kreuger, 2004; Weil, 2002).  Again, satisfaction may be used as a measurement for the equity argument, with proponents claiming that an increase in parental and/or student satisfaction is a valid measure of success (Dillon, 2007; Witte, 1999).

The regulated version of a voucher, like the Milwaukee plan, is alleged to help poor and minority students perform better by limiting access to the voucher program to families who are determined needy (La Noue, 1972).  Although regulated voucher plans often differ in their criteria for determining ‘needy’, the Milwaukee plan limits participation to families who earn at or under 1.75 times the poverty level.  Once enrolled, the family’s income can rise to 2.2 times poverty and still remain eligible, with a slightly higher cap for siblings (WSD, 2006).

This argument contains within it a premise of the concept of equity, whereby the government has a role to help underprivileged people (La Noue, 1972).  While this premise has generally been accepted as true in America, the degree, conditions and limitations of aid are matters of controversy even among advocates (Weil, 2002).  One problem with this argument is that voucher plans which start off with a strict definition of ‘needy’ can later be expanded to include anyone and everyone, thereby undermining the equitable goals of the program (Witte, 1999).

Ideology Goals: Privatization.  The issue of school vouchers is really the issue of privatization, and a consideration of any voucher proposal requires understanding the larger context of the push toward privatization that has been constantly influencing American thought since Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Weil, 2002).  At various times in our nation’s history, Smith’s free-market economic principles have manifested proposals for privatization of virtually all major public service programs, including prisons, education, social security, police and health and human services, to name a few (Weil, 2002; Privatization.org, 2008).   The fundamental premise of the privatization argument is that competition in the free market will cause improved performance of all (La Noue, 1972; Blum, 1958; Weil, 2002).

Since the 1970’s, the resurgence of Smith’s theory of the primacy of the market underlies the normative argument (SEU, 2008) to be found in the ideal of the smallest possible government and the use of private corporations to deliver public services (Weil, 2002; La Noue, 1972).  Weil aptly states that “Those who propose that public education be dismantled in favor of privatization of public schools and public school services are questioning the very notion of a truly public education.”  To exemplify this extreme position, a voucher proposal in the form of Proposition 38 was offered to California voters in 2000.  Prop. 38 proposed completely dismantling public education entirely within a matter of a few years including all education funding whatsoever after the proceeds from selling off all publicly owned schools had been exhausted.  Since the Prop. 38 initiative was defeated by more than a 2 to 1 margin in California (LAO, 2008; Keenan, 2008) voucher proponents have changed their strategy to de-emphasize privatization and emphasize other arguments instead (Uhler, 2000; Weil, 2002).

Opposing Goals and Arguments.  Those who oppose vouchers have consistently set forth two primary goals: ensure education is available and accessible to everyone and keep the quality as high as possible.  To reach these goals voucher opponents stress the importance of maintaining a public school system.  Their criticisms of the voucher proposals fall into three primary arguments: a) vouchers will harm public school performance; b) vouchers will harm poor and minority student performance; and c) vouchers will tend to cause the reduction and possible elimination of the public school system, which is fundamental to a free society.

 Vouchers Harm Public School Quality.  Opponents claim that while the voucher program is intended to improve public school performance by forcing them to compete, the actual results of the program will create the opposite effect by taking away critical resources (Forman, 2004).  They also argue that under a voucher program student sorting is likely to occur, which will further harm school-level performance by removing the better students (McEwan, 2004).

Vouchers Harm Poor and Minority Students.  Opponents say that the claim of vouchers helping poor and minority students are false, and that vouchers actually harm the poor and minorities in the long run rather than help them.  One of the complaints about the Milwaukee-style regulated vouchers is that they are inequitable.  The National Education Association argues that “a voucher lottery is a terrible way to determine access to an education.  True equity means the ability for every child to attend a good school in the neighborhood” (NEA, 2008).  The NEA cites Milton Friedman’s recognition that vouchers should be unregulated (unlimited participation) in favor of freedom of private enterprise to experiment as a ground for claiming that vouchers will not help minority students.  Even minorities most expected to benefit from vouchers question whether such a program will actually help them (Cooper, 2005) and minority support is not as strong as would be expected by voucher proponents (Leal, 2004).   Part of this argument includes a recognition that vouchers will not cover the entire cost of tuition at some private schools (NEA, 2008), thereby sorting students by socioeconomic status into differing private schools of differing quality.  This would in effect replicate the racial and socioeconomic divide seen presently between public schools and private schools.   If, however, the voucher program requires participating private schools to accept the voucher as full tuition, only those schools of lesser quality (and cost) will participate in the voucher program, again reinforcing the divide between voucher schools and nonvoucher private schools.

Vouchers May Eliminate Public Education.  Thomas Jefferson was one of the earliest proponents of a public education system and he believed it was a fundamental prerequisite to the maintenance of a free society and a free people.  At the same time, Jefferson recognized the value of the free market, but argued that the free market would not suffice for this area of concern (Jefferson, 1800).  The predominant view in America since the early 1900’s has been heavily influenced by the Great Depression and the resulting social conscience and welfare system created by Roosevelt’s New Deal (La Noue, 1972).  The idea that the free market is fallible, and that government involvement is necessary and proper for not only regulating the market but also for managing social programs to equalize markets and stabilize society, was solidly embedded in the American consciousness during this period.  The rapid growth of the public school system was only one area of widespread growth of government services being provided by public employees (Weil, 2002).  These public services have been determined by most communities in America to be essential and ought to be properly delivered by government, not by private corporations (NEAW, 2008; Jefferson, 1800).

Many who oppose vouchers do so not necessarily because they believe the public schools are performing well.  Indeed, there are many who criticize the public schools methods, performance and results but oppose vouchers because they oppose the larger concept of privatization (Rome and Block, 2005).  Rome and Block argue that while public education is basically a form of socialism, which they generally oppose, they argue that vouchers will only make socialism more prevalent, not less. This argument asserts that public control of public education system is paramount and should not be given over to private interests (NEAW, 2008; Patrick, 1994). The California Constitution specifically authorizes the state to create a public education system, with a mandate to “encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement” (CSS, 2008).     

III.       Evidence

Quality Improvement.  Voucher plans report different results on quality in different locations.  A study from Columbia showed a marked improvement in graduation rates and student achievement among student using vouchers (Angrist et al., 2006), however, this population was largely racially homogenous.  Conversely, a long-term study of 30,000 Denmark students showed no overall average improvement among the voucher students, but when broken down into socio-economic status groups (SES), higher SES correlated to improved achievement while lower SES correlated to lower performance from that  of public school students.  This study also found that parents did not always choose private schools based solely on academic performance, and moreover that high SES schools tended to increase the performance of all their students, even low SES students, while low SES schools will tended to lower the academic performance of all their students, even high SES students (Andersen, 2008).  This finding supports the argument that privatization will increase the educational disparity between rich and poor in society.  A regional study shows that vouchers have not displayed any impact on regional growth rates (King, 2005).

In the U.S., voucher experiments in New York, Milwaukee and Ohio and Washington DC have reported very limited, if any, improvement in academic performance overall, with a similar disparity in SES group achievement from that seen in Denmark (Angrist, 2006; Weil, 2002; NEA, 2008).   It is noteworthy that any improvements noticed were only within the voucher study group.  The control groups (a.k.a. the public school students) saw no significant improvement, although in some instances public schools performed better than private schools in a particular subject or for a particular year (Witte, 1999).  Doerr et. al (1996) reported on a study by Money magazine from 1994 which found that public schools were better than private schools on a number of grounds including student performance and teacher qualifications (p.89-92).   McEwan’s research indicates that large-scale voucher plans (i.e. universal) encourage student sorting, which could significantly lower public school performance. He says “there is no compelling evidence that such losses are outweighed by competitive gains in public schools.” (McEwan, 2004).

New York. A detailed study of the New York voucher program concluded that the positive effects of vouchers on black students was no greater than by chance, and pointed out that the method by which race is determined is also significant in any analysis.  Mixed-race children are common and the method by which their race is determined[2] in analysis can significantly alter the interpretation of the results (Krueger, 2004).   The New York program demonstrated that student sorting clearly arises even in small, means-tested urban voucher programs, and would likely intensify under a universal plan.  Furthermore, beneficiaries of the voucher program tend to be advantaged rather than disadvantaged (Howell, 2004).

Cleveland. A 2003 study of the Cleveland voucher experiment indicated that the voucher program tended to attract Caucasian, Hispanic or Multiracial students whereas public school students tended to be African American.  It also reported that public school teachers generally had better qualifications than private schools, that larger class sizes were performing better than smaller classes, and that there was no overall improvement in performance in voucher students when all factors were controlled for.  Importantly, this study identified that some families could not participate because the voucher did not cover the entire cost of the tuition and expenses at private schools (NEA, 2008).

Milwaukee.  As one of the oldest choice programs, the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) has had numerous studies and evaluations on its effectiveness.  The Carnegie Foundation study report indicated that the performance results from Milwaukee were discouraging.  Forty percent of voucher students did not return the following year, and test scores showed no improvement in the first three years, remaining below average (Doerr et al., 1996, p.111).

The program’s official evaluation (1990-1995) found both positive and negative effects.  Among the positive, parents of voucher students reported greater satisfaction with the private school than they had with the previous public school, the relatively high parental involvement of voucher parents tended to increase further, and attendance was slightly higher than their public school counterparts.  The private schools also benefited by increased enrollment, lowered teacher turnover and increased financial stability leading to expansion of some schools.  Among the negative, better-educated and more active parents left the public school system[3], about 30% of voucher students left the program each year and returned to the public schools, and three private schools went bankrupt, with two principals indicted and one in prison.  The achievement of students is a somewhat more complicated matter due to divergent methods of analysis, but the author of the report concludes that there was no demonstrated pattern of superiority of the voucher students over the public school students, or visa versa.  The author cautions against the unwarranted expansion of the program from its initial design, identifying that in such case advantaged students will be more likely to gain than disadvantaged. (Witte, 1999).   Despite the inconclusiveness of this 5-year study and over the cautions voiced by the author about expansion of the program, the program was expanded anyway and the study was terminated.

A 2008 longitudinal study of the Milwaukee program reported that enrollment in the voucher program has grown dramatically after 1998, from less than 2000 students to over 18,000 students in the current year.  This study also reported that the private schools tended to have smaller class sizes, which for 60% of the private schools voucher students comprised more than 80% of their total students, and almost 80% of the participating private schools described themselves as religious.  The report concluded a) that while some Wisconsin taxpayers benefited from the program, Milwaukee homeowners did not; and b) the average performance of voucher students was below national averages but similar to the public school students (Wolf, 2008).  A new report from the Economic Policy Institute concludes that the Milwaukee plan has not spurred competition or improved academic performance of either the voucher schools or the public schools (WEAC, 2007).

The Milwaukee plan has had a significant cost to local citizens and an overall negative impact on the public schools in that city.  According to the Milwaukee Journal, “at the same time that Milwaukee Public School officials are wrestling with school closings and declining enrollment, the precedent-setting private school voucher program in Milwaukee is booming.”  As voucher use increases in Milwaukee, so do the costs.  In 2006 the Milwaukee plan cost over $110 million just for the voucher program.  Property taxes in Milwaukee rose 7.7% that year to raise an additional $16.5 million for education, of which $7.6 million was directly attributable to the voucher program (46%), even though only 24% of city students were using vouchers.  Each additional student in the public schools cost taxpayers an additional $91 in property tax, but each additional voucher student cost them $447.  Currently, Milwaukee pays about $7,500 annually for each student, and voucher enrollment increased from 15,000 to 18,000 voucher participants in 2006.  If all slots are filled, Milwaukee will exceed $110 million on vouchers in one year.  (Borsuk, 2006).   In addition to the total cost of the program, of special note is that forty percent (40%) of the money spent on vouchers was actually unnecessary and constituted an overpayment beyond the schools’ actual tuition.  For the 1998-99 year the overpayment totaled over $11 million (PFAW, 2001).  This overpayment occurs because the voucher legislation allocates a specific amount based on what the public expenditure would be, not what the private tuition actually is.  Although current figures for the most recent year is not available, the statute’s formula which determines the amount of the voucher has not changed, and the overpayment problem continues today.

Homogenization and Global Convergence. Loomis et al. provide a thorough institutional analysis of education as a worldwide industry and conclude that vouchers exacerbate and hasten an already apparent trend toward global convergence between public and private schools resulting from drives to reduce educational costs and compete in an ever expanding market.  Loomis et al. show that all educational institutions are subject to the phenomenon of information division as a result of continual pressures to collectivize and compete.  In other words, maintaining unique information or process is more costly.  This tendency, therefore, is really toward a homogenization of both information and process.  Creating a private-public partnership through vouchers reduces the differentiation that private schools can offer (Loomis et. al., 2007), and this claim is substantiated by the language of the Milwaukee plan in that only ‘approved’ schools are allowed to participate in the voucher program (WSD, 2006).  By participating, these schools commit to a degree of uniformity between public and private schools, providing the “camel’s nose under the tent” to increasing such regulation and uniformity over time.  The fact that private voucher schools must agree to submit students to statewide standardized testing at grades 4, 8 and 10 means that a significant portion of the curriculum content to be taught is dictated by the content of the standardized test students are expected to take.[4]   ‘Teaching to the test’ as a mode of teaching has thus been institutionalized in every participating school by the structure of the voucher plan itself.[5]  This is in line with the uniformity of a global government and a global education system envisioned by America 2000 and the New World Order (Patrick, 1994; Estulin, 2007).   

IV.             Feasibility

The overall feasibility of adopting a voucher program in California is low due to three primary factors: cost, structure of governments, and history.

 Cost.  There are a number of factors in the category of cost that together make it unlikely that California will adopt a school voucher plan.  First is the recognition that a Milwaukee-style plan will increase educational spending overall, as demonstrated in Milwaukee (Wolf, 2008; Borsuk, 2006). 

How did Milwaukee pay for the increase, and can California follow their example?  Milwaukee paid for their voucher program by increasing their local property tax.  California cannot increase the property tax without repealing Proposition 13 (1978).  California voters have historically been opposed to higher taxes.  In fact, Prop. 13 altered the state Constitution to strictly limit property tax rate increases statewide to 2% annually (Lawrence, 2007) and provided an immediate tax reduction on real property of about 57% to the average homeowner.  It also changed the Constitution to require a 2/3 majority to pass any new taxes in the legislature, or even pass the state budget.  Prop. 13 has benefited mainly homeowners, who also are the largest population of voters, and a Milwaukee style voucher plan would require the repeal of Prop. 13 before funding for the program could be generated through property tax increases.

An alternative to property tax revenue would be the state’s general fund, but California’s general fund is too volatile to sustain an additional demand for voucher funding.  California’s general fund is based primarily on personal income taxes, sales and use taxes, both of which are highly elastic based on the state’s economy.  Swings in economic conditions result in gyrations of the general fund that make education funding in California already precarious and led to Prop. 98 in 1998 to earmark over 40% of the state’s general fund for education spending (LAO, 2008).   The constraints on the budget have led many to characterize the state’s fiscal condition as ‘out of control’ (Lawrence, 2007).  In this environment, the increased cost factor of the Milwaukee plan alone makes it unfeasible in California.

Structure of Governments Hinders Local Action.  The loss of local revenue by Prop. 13 has shifted funding for the majority of all local public education to the state.  As a reaction to this, voters approved Proposition 98 in 1998, which created an automatic spending allocation (done by formula) from the state’s general fund for education statewide.  The state pays for about 2/3 of all K-14 education for all local schools (LAO, 2006).  Prop. 13 and Prop 98 are thus two key constraints in California which make operations of local schools completely dependent upon the state.  Thus, where the Milwaukee plan could be implemented at a local level in Milwaukee, and not the rest of Wisconsin, in California, whether by initiative or by legislation, the plan would have to be a state-wide decision and program. 

Prop 98. adds a further complication to the implementation of a voucher program.  Will Prop. 98 be interpreted to mean that vouchers are included or beyond the formula spending allocation?  Regardless of which determination is made, a problem ensues:  If the cost of vouchers has to be contained within the normal spending allocations of Prop 98, then every dollar spent on a voucher is a dollar taken away from public schools – this creates a zero-sum game.  This is not the case in Milwaukee, where voucher proponents were able to successfully argue that the voucher program would not harm the public school system.[6]  However, it is noteworthy that this creates an equality issue, because a constitutionally viable voucher program (one that does not harm the public schools) would rescue only a small number of public school children, leaving many with an inadequate education (Harvard Law Review, 2007).  If, on the other hand, the cost of vouchers is outside of the Prop 98 spending formula, then this creates a huge addition to the state’s expenditure requirements.  A study of fiscal effects of Prop. 174 (1993) concluded that if a small number of students shifted to vouchers the overall educational costs of the state would increase, while if large number of students shifted the costs would decrease, thereby making the fiscal impacts largely unpredictable and risky (Shires et al., 1994).  The current fiscal environment in California makes it politically and economically unfeasible to take that risk.

History: California Opposed Vouchers.  California voters decided they were opposed to a voucher programs in 1993 (Prop. 174) and again in 2000 (Prop. 38) (Keenon, 2007).  The 2000 vote margin of more than 2 to 1 in California indicated that the opposition to vouchers was quite strong, however, the fact that the proposal differed significantly from the Milwaukee plan could be relevant.  Prop. 38 would have offered to all students a voucher regardless of family income, where the Milwaukee plan limited participation in numbers and only to low-income families. 

Additionally, public school teachers comprise one of the largest interest groups in California (Lawrence, 2007), and they have consistently opposed voucher programs based on their belief that vouchers would harm public education (Foreman, 2004; NEA, 2008).  Their influence and voice in California is significant and usually controls on matters of education as we have witnessed with both Props. 38 and 98.  The voucher proponents are not nearly as large, organized or consistent as the public teachers’ unions.  A Milwaukee-style limitation on participation might be viewed differently than Prop. 38, but the relatively recent and overwhelming defeat of the 1993 and 2000 propositions make it unlikely that another such initiative or legislative proposal would be politically feasible in the near future in California.

Legal Questions.  Challenges to voucher programs on legal grounds have been numerous.  The US Supreme Court ruled in 2002 that vouchers are not unconstitutional per se on First Amendment grounds, but state court challenges have found vouchers unconstitutional on other grounds (Davis, 2006; Bradley, 2008, Erickson, 2008).  Most states, including California, have a state constitutional provision prohibiting the diversion of public money to sectarian schools (BAW, 2008) and/or requiring uniformity (Davis, 2006).   However, California might be able to sidestep the legal question if the voucher proposal is adopted via initiative rather than through the legislature, as was attempted in 2000 (Borsuk, 2006).  If adopted by initiative, the proposal could completely eliminate opposing provisions of the state constitution as Prop. 38 would have done.  However, if the proposal is adopted through the legislature as a statute, Constitutional challenges would be certain and would most likely invalidate the voucher plan (CLI, 2008).

V.        Assessment

I conclude that a Milwaukee-style voucher plan for California is neither desirable nor feasible.  From a quality perspective, the research clearly denies Blum’s contention that vouchers do not necessarily harm the public schools.  The charter and magnet schools more closely correlate with Blum’s theory (Vergari, 2007).  Based on my analysis, it seems likely that a voucher plan, a.k.a. privatization of education, would widen and deepen the division between rich and poor (high and low SES) and eliminate the leveling tendencies of the public school system (Howell, 2004).  The research to date does not support the claims that voucher programs improve performance, and where any improvements are seen they indicate that any benefits of vouchers accrue only to students leaving the public school system, and no benefits accrue to the students remaining in the public schools (Wolf, 2008; Witte, 1999; Weil, 2002). The natural conclusion to that disparity is the reduction and eventual elimination of the public school system.  The evidence from Milwaukee shows that the public school system suffers from the voucher program while increasing taxes, yet vouchers students show no overall significant improvement (Witte, 1999; Wolf, 2008).   Moreover, voucher schools have in some cases (like Milwaukee) been allowed to exclude disabled students, thereby demonstrating the importance of maintaining the public school system (Harvard Law Review, 2007).

From an equity perspective, I conclude that a voucher system is not equitable and fair to all students.  The evidence shows that advantaged rather than disadvantaged students tend to use vouchers in a universal program (Howell, 2004).  In a regulated program, poorly performing students who could benefit most by vouchers could be excluded because their parents earn over the limit (WSD, 2006), and limited space in private schools means that not every qualified voucher student will find a seat in the school of their choice.   Although public schools may be crowded, every student gets in.

From an ideology perspective, I believe that the evidence shows that a public school system is necessary and proper for a free society (Jefferson, 1800), and therefore any program which would tend to eliminate public education I would oppose.  The evidence strongly shows that vouchers do not spur competition or improve performance (WEAC, 2007).  I concur with Loomis et. al in their contention that vouchers will tend to homogenize education and hasten global convergence between public and private institutions (2006).  As an advocate of diversity, I oppose homogenization.  As an advocate of freedom, I oppose global convergence (Estulin, 2007; Corsi, 2007; Patrick, 1994).  I agree with Cooper (2008) in his assessment that the voucher debate is heavily permeated on both sides by fear.

Finally, the financial constraints in California due to Propositions 13 and 98, along with its volatile general fund, make it unlikely that a voucher plan which promises to increase educational costs could survive political debate.   The particular formulation of the Milwaukee plan is wasteful and unnecessarily subsidizes private schools because it can pay schools more than their tuition rates (PFAW, 2008).  Analysis of the Washington D.C. voucher program by the GAO reports that implementation of a voucher program can be mishandled and result in reduced accountability for public money (GAO, 2007).  This finding poses a particularly unacceptable risk in California’s fiscal environment.  Furthermore, the political opposition to vouchers by the various public teacher associations in California is a significant impediment to passage of any voucher proposal (Forman, 2004; NEA, 2008).  The political power that these associations have makes it unlikely that legislators will advocate a voucher plan in the legislature, and their high visibility in the public makes it unlikely that a voucher initiative can pass either.

Although the public school system is not performing as well as desired by many, the Milwaukee voucher plan proposal is not a desirable or feasible solution for California’s education issues.  This report makes no evaluation about other voucher plans beyond the Milwaukee policy. Additionally, this author believes that there are other mechanisms besides vouchers that are available for reform of public education that can be successfully used to improve performance of the public schools, but these are outside the scope of this document.

VI.       Appendix

 Summary of Main Elements of the Milwaukee Plan (WSD, 2006):

 

1.      An annual limit to the number of participants in the voucher program is set by statute, and was recently revised from 15,000 to 22,500.  Each year schools can determine how many voucher students they will accept.

2.      Only families who earn at or under 1.75 times the poverty level qualify (can increase after enrolling to a max. of 2.2 times); siblings are subject to a slightly higher income rate.

3.      Vouchers are only redeemable by approved schools that meet specific criteria including nondiscriminatory practices, compliance with all relevant health and safety codes, become accredited, etc.

4.      A complicated formula for compensation works out roughly to about $6,500 per student annually (Borsuk, 2006).

5.      The city is responsible for transportation requirements created by transfers to voucher schools.

6.      Each participating private school must annually meet at least one of four performance criteria specified.

7.      Each participating private school must participate in annual standardized testing of all students in 4^th, 8^th and 10^th grades and deliver the scores to analysts for review.

8.      Students cannot be required to participate in any religious activities.

 

9.      Private schools may be kicked from the voucher program for any number of violations of policy or procedure.

10.  Education is managed at the city / local level and funded primarily by the local property tax.

 

This is only a summary of the key elements of the Milwaukee plan deemed relevant to this review.  The Milwaukee statute can be viewed in its entirety at: http://www.legis.state.wi.us/statutes/stat0119.pdf.

VII.     Selected Bibliography

1. Andersen, Simon. “Private Schools and the Parents that Choose Them: Empirical Evidence from the Danish School Voucher System.” Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol 31, No 1, 2008.

2. Angrist, J., et. al., Long-Term Educational Consequences of Secondary School Vouchers: Evidence from Administrative Records in Colombia. The American Economic Review v. 96 no. 3 (June 2006) p. 847-62.

3. Antee, Jacki. Anti Vouchers View.  CalTax website. School Vouchers: Pro and Con Views.  October 2000.  Available online at: http://www.caltax.org/documents/2000/oct00-3.htm, accessed 4/1/2008.

4. Blum, Virgil, S.J., Freedom of Choice in Education, New York: Macmillan, 1958.

5. Blaine Amendments website (BAW), 2008.  Available online at: http://www.blaineamendments.org/states/states_files/CA.html, accessed 4/3/2008.

6. Borsuk, Alan. “Vouchers to pass $100 million mark”, Milwaukee Sentinel, Nov, 20, 2006.  Available online at: http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=533306, accessed 3/28/08.

7. Bradley, Jada. “School Voucher Referendum Defeated in Utah,” The Crisis, Winter, 2008.

8. California Legislative Information (CLI) website.  Constitution of 1879.  Available online at: http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/const.html, accessed 4/1/2008.

9. California Secretary of State (CSS) website.  State Archives.  Constitution of 1849.  Available online at: http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/level3_const1849txt.html, accessed 4/1/2008.

10. Cooper, Bruce; Randall, E. Vance. “Fear and Privatization.” Educational Policy, 2008; 22; 204, Sage Publications.

11. Cooper, Camille. “School Choice and the Standpoint of African American Mothers: Considering the Power of Positionality,” Journal of Negro Education, Spring 2005, Vol.74, Issue 2, p174-189.

12. Corsi PhD, Jerome. The Late Great USA – The Coming Merger with Mexico and Canada. WND Books, New York, 2007.

13. Davis, Wendy. “Vouchers Tested.” ABA Journal, June 2006, Vol. 92, Issue 6, p16-17.

14. Debray-Pelot. “School Choice and Educational Privatization Initiatives in the 106^th and 107^th Congresses; An Analysis of Policy Formation and Political Ideologies.”, Teachers College Record, Vol 109, No. 4, April 2007, pp.927-972.
15. Dillon, Sam. “Voucher Use in Washington Wins Praise of Parents”, New York Times, 6/22/2007, p13, 0p.

 

16. Doerr, Edd; Menendez, Albert; Swomley, John. The Case Against School Vouchers.  Prometheus Books, New York.  1996.

 

17. Erickson, Tiffany; Bernick, Bob Jr. “Vouchers Killed”, Desert Morning News, Nov. 7, 2007.  Available online at: http://www.deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,695225580,00.html, accessed 3/30/2008.

 

18. Estulin, Daniel. The True Story of the Bilderberger Group.  Trine Day LLC, Oregon. 2007.

 

19. Forman, Michele. “School Vouchers and School Choice,” Encounter, Summer 2004, Vol 17, Issue 2, p22-24.

 

20. Government Accountability Office (GAO). “District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Program”. Report to Congressional Requestors. Nov 2007. Available online at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d089.pdf, accessed 4/10/2008.

 

21. Goldberg, Bruce. Why Schools Fail.  Cato Institute, 1996.

 

22. Harvard Law Review. “Recent Cases”, 2007, Vol. 120, pp1097-1104.

 

23. Howell, William. “Dynamic Selection Effects in Means-Tested, Urban School Voucher Programs”, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Hoboken: Spring, 2004, Vol. 23, Issue 2, p.225.

 

24. Hoxby, Caroline.  “Does Competition Among Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?”, The American Economic Review, Dec 2000; 90, 5; ABI/INFORM Global, p1209. 

 

25. Jefferson, Thomas.  Quoted material from various sources, circa 1800.  Available online at: http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff1370.htm, accessed 4/12/2008.

 

26. Keenon, David. “Vouchers Go Down to Defeat”. Rethinking Schools website, available online at: http://www.rethinkingschools.org/archive/15_02/Vou152.shtml, accessed 3/30/2008.

 

27. King, Kerry. “The Impacts of School Choice on Regional Economic Growth.” Review of Regional Studies; Winter 2005, Vol 35, Issue 3, p356-368.

 

28. Kreuger, Alan. “Another Look at the New York City School Voucher Experiment,” The American Behavioral Scientist; Jan 2004; 47,5, p658.

 

29. La Noue, George. Educational Vouchers: Concepts and Controversies.  Teachers College Press, New York.  1972.

 

30. Lawrence, David. California – The Politics of Diversity. Thompson Wadsworth.  2007.

 

31. Legislative Analysts Office (LAO) website.  Revenue Volatility In California. Jan, 2005.  Available online at: http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/rev_vol/rev_volatility_012005.pdf, accessed 3/30/2008.

 

32. Legislative Analysts Office (LAO) website. Summary of ‘Performance Accountability Voucher for Education’, Feb, 2000, available online at:  http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2000/000031_INT.htm, accessed 4/1/2008.

 

33. Leal, David. “Latinos and School Vouchers: Testing the Minority Support Hypothesis”, Social Science Quarterly, Dec 2004, Vol.85, Issue 5, p.1227-1237.

 

34. Loomis, Steven; Rodriguez, Jacob; Honeycutt, Jared; Arellano, Manuel. “Public-private Convergence and the Special Case of Voucher-receiving Schools,” London Review of Education, Vol.4, No.3, Nov. 2006, pp239-251.

 

35. McEwan, Patrick. “The Potential Impact of Vouchers,” Peabody Journal of Education, 2004; Vol 79, Issue 3, p57-80.

 

36. National Education Association (NEA). “Evaluation of the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program”, Indiana University School of Education.  Available online at : http:www.nea.org/vouchers/clevelandstudy12-03.html, accessed 3/2/08.

 

37. National Education Association website (NEAW). “Vouchers”.  Available online at http://www.nea.org/vouchers/index.html, accessed 2/28/2008.

 

38. Patrick, James. America 2000 / Goals 2000 – Moving the Nation Educationally to a “New World Order”. Citizens for Academic Excellence, Illinois, 1994.

 

39. People for the American Way (PFAW). “The 40 Percent Surcharge: How Taxpayers Overpay for Milwaukee’s Private School Voucher Program”, 2001.  Available online at: http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=1524, accessed 4/17/2008.

 

40. Privatization.org, available online at http://www.privatization.org/index.cfm, accessed 4/4/2008.

 

41. Rome, Gregory; Block, Walter. “Schoolhouse Socialism”, Journal of Instructional Psychology, Vol. 33, Issue 1, 2005?

 

42. St. Edwards University website (SEU). “Normative Ethical Principals and Theories: A Brief Overview”. Available online at: http://www.stedwards.edu/ursery/norm.htm, accessed 4/2/2008.

 

43. Shires, Michael; Krop, Cathy; Rydell, Peter; Carroll, Stephen. “The Effects of the California Voucher Initiative on Public Expenditures for Education”. RAND Institute on Education and Training. 1994.  Available online at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR364.pdf, accessed 4/10/2008.

 

44. Stone, Deborah. Policy Paradox. WW Norton, New York, 2007.

 

45. Tancredo, Senator Tom. In Mortal Danger – The Battle for America’s Border and Security. WND Books, Nashville, TN, 2006.

 

46. Uhler, Lewis. Pro Vouchers View.  CalTax website. School Vouchers: Pro and Con Views.  October 2000.  Available online at: http://www.caltax.org/documents/2000/oct00-3.htm, accessed 4/1/2008.

 

47. US Department of Education (DOE). “Federal Role In Education”. Available online at: http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html?src=ln, accessed 3/30/2008.

 

48. Vergari, Sandra. “The Politics of Charter Schools.” Educational Policy, 2007, Sage Publications, 2007, Vol.21.

 

49. Weil, Danny. School Vouchers and Privatization. ABC-CLIO Books, Santa Barnbara, CA.  2002.

 

50. Witte, John F.  “The Milwaukee Voucher Experiment – The Good, the Bad and the Ugly. Phi Delta Kappan, Sept. 1999, available online at: http://www.mediatransparency.org/reprints/milwaukee_voucher_experiment.htm, accessed 4/10/2008.

 

51. Wisconsin Education Association Council (WEAC). “Milwaukee Voucher Program Doesn’t Spur Competition”. October, 2007.  Available online at: http://www.weac.org/News/2007-08/oct07/voucherreport.htm, accessed 4/19/2008.

 

52. Wisconsin Stats. Database (WSD), Public Statutes, Chapter 119, “Milwaukee parental choice program”, 2005-6.  Available online at: http://www.legis.state.wi.us/statutes/stat0119.pdf, accessed 3/28/08.

 

53. Wolf, Patrick. “The Comprehensive Longitudinal Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program”.  Department of Education, University of Arkansas. Feb 2008.  Available online at: http://www.uark.edu/ua/der/SCDP/Milwaukee_Eval/Report_1.pdf, accessed 4/11/2008.

 

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[1] The key provisions of the Milwaukee plan are provided in the Appendix.

[2] In some locations the mother’s race is used, in others the father’s, and in some self-identification is permitted – there is no universally-accepted protocol for determining a person’s race.

[3] Witte points out that had they remained in the public schools these parents would likely have been instrumental forces for change in the public school system and he assesses that their departure from the public schools was a loss to the public schools.

[4] Many of the voucher schools have failed to comply with this requirement timely or at all, resulting in some being kicked out of the program and delaying analysis of the results by over a year.  Analysts are not pleased.

[5] It is ironic and troubling to see that ‘teaching to the test’ is widely criticized as being one of the biggest problems in education today (Goldberg, 1996; Weil, 2002) yet is essentially mandated by the Milwaukee plan (WSD, 2006), thereby significantly curbing a private school’s ability to be different from public schools.

[6] Although proponents successfully argued this and got the statute passed, their claims have not held true in practice.  School closings in the Milwaukee Public School system are now commonplace due to declining enrollment and poor performance (WEAC, 2007).